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Mitchell: Fifth Amendment – Rights of the Accused

TRIAL ERROR BLUNDER:
COMPOUNDED USE OF DEFENDANT’S POST-ARREST
SILENCE FOR IMPEACHMENT AND SUMMATION PURPOSES
IS NOT HARMLESS
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Tucker1
(decided September 20, 2011)

I.

THE MATTER OF PEOPLE V. TUCKER

The defendant in this action appealed his conviction of two
counts of second degree attempted murder and first degree attempted
robbery.2 After his arrest, the defendant was questioned by law
enforcement officers yet remained silent.3 At trial, “the People were
permitted to question him about his post-arrest silence” and comment
further upon it repeatedly during summation.4 On appeal, the court
determined “post-arrest silence . . . cannot be used for impeachment
purposes”5 and the use of such silence against a defendant is
1

929 N.Y.S.2d 631 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2011).
Id. at 632.
3
Id. at 632-33.
4
Id.; see People v. Conyers, 420 N.E.2d 933, 935 (N.Y. 1981) (“[W]e conclude that the
use of such evidence for impeachment purposes cannot be justified . . . .”).
5
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 633; see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 628 (1993)
(stating the use of a defendant‟s silence for impeachment purposes after Miranda warnings
were given is a violation of “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [and]
[t]his rule „rests on the fundamental unfairness of implicitly assuring a suspect that his
silence will not be held against him and then using his silence to impeach an explanation
subsequently offered at trial‟ ”) (quoting Wainright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291
(1986)).
2

839
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“fundamentally unfair.”6 The Appellate Division held both issues
were permitted in error, overturned the conviction, and remanded the
matter for a new trial.7
People v. Tucker8 concerns the shootings of Asin Nelson and
Stanley McKinnon.9 Within hours of the shootings, the defendant,
Tucker, was arrested as a suspect and read his Miranda10 rights.11
The police asked the defendant if he was willing to talk about the
incident.12 He responded, “No.”13 Subsequently, a police officer
informed the defendant that he was going to be charged for attempted
murder.14 It was at this point the defendant said, “I was there, but I
didn‟t shoot anybody.”15 After he made that statement, the defendant
remained silent.16 A suppression hearing was held and the statement
was suppressed.17 During the jury trial, an eye witness and the two
victims testified that the defendant was the shooter, and that he wore
a black hooded sweatshirt at the time of the incident.18 The jury was
shown grainy video footage of the shooting, post-arrest photographs
of the defendant, and still images from the video.19 The eyewitness
and the victims were unable to identify one man in the video who
was wearing a “do-rag” and a white long-sleeved t-shirt.20 In his own
defense, the defendant testified he was the man in the white t-shirt.21
While this established his presence at the shooting, the defendant
6

Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 633; see also Brecht, 507 U.S. at 628.
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
8
929 N.Y.S.2d 631 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2011).
9
Id. at 636 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
10
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 636; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (holding if someone is
taken into custody the four Miranda warnings are: (1) before being questioned the suspect
must be warned about his or her “right to remain silent;” (2) that anything the suspect says
“can be used against him [or her] in a court of law;” (3) that the suspect “has the right to the
presence of an attorney;” (4) that if the suspect “cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him [or her] prior to any questioning if [the suspect] so desires”).
12
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 632-33 (majority opinion).
13
Id. at 633.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 636 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
16
Id. at 633 (majority opinion).
17
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
7
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claimed he was not the shooter.22 Instead, he testified the person in
the video dressed in black was his friend “Mustafa” and that
“Mustafa” was responsible for the victim‟s injuries.23
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the defendant
multiple times if he had told the police the identity of the shooter
after his arrest.24 The following is the pertinent part of the
prosecutor‟s questioning the defendant:
Q. Did you tell the police it was Mustafa who did the
shooting?
A. I told the police. They asked me did you shoot him.
I told the police [,] I was there but I didn‟t shoot
nobody.
Q. But you didn‟t tell them it was Mustafa; right?
A. They asked me. They asked me—
THE COURT: Answer the question.
Q. Did you tell them it was Mustafa?
THE COURT: Answer that question.
A. No.25
Another major issue occurred during the prosecutor‟s summation.26
A repeated reference to the defendant‟s silence after his arrest was
stressed by the district attorney.27 It was said, “[A]n innocent person
when they‟re arrested for a crime they didn‟t commit and they know
who did it will say [who] did it.”28 This was combined with the
statement that “the defendant tailored his testimony that he was the
man dressed in white after listening to the testimony of the
victims.”29
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 632 (majority opinion).
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
Id.
Id. at 636 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
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The reasoning of the Appellate Division concentrated on
whether it was improper to use post-arrest silence for impeachment
purposes at the defendant‟s criminal trial.30 The risk of prejudice is
considerable and of little probative value “whenever the prosecution
attempts to impeach a defendant‟s trial testimony by questioning him
about his prior failure to come forward.”31 The United States
Supreme Court has held “[i]n such circumstances it [is]
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the
arrested person‟s silence to be used to impeach an explanation
subsequently offered at trial.”32 However, if a suspect speaks to
police and the “given circumstances make it most unnatural to omit
certain information from a statement, the fact of the omission is itself
admissible for purposes of impeachment.”33 Here, the defendant
invoked his right to remain silent.34 The court found this case was
“squarely controlled” by the decisions in People v. Santiago35 and
People v. Torres.36 In Santiago, the Appellate Division stated, “the
defendant‟s mere denial of his involvement in the shooting upon
arrest was not tantamount to a waiver of his right to remain silent.”37
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals held “[t]he State is denied
the right to draw adverse inferences from the fact that the defendant
has maintained effective silence, even if something less than total.”38
In the instant matter, after his arrest, Tucker did not wish to
30

Id. at 633 (majority opinion).
Conyers, 420 N.E.2d at 935.
32
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
33
People v. Savage, 409 N.E.2d 858, 861 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that “an omission speaks
more eloquently than words” especially when “[i]t [would have] put an entirely different
cast on the event” if it had been mentioned).
34
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
35
501 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403-04 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1986); see also Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at
634.
36
490 N.Y.S.2d 793, 794-95 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1985); see also Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at
634 (stating the defendants in Santiago and Torres simply denied participation in their
respective crimes); Santiago, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 403-04 (explaining the State is not allowed
the right to “draw adverse inferences” from the defendant invoking his right to remain silent
and “the prosecutor‟s questioning of the defendant [during the trial] in this regard was in
error”); Torres, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 794-95 (stating the “prosecutor's inquiry concerning the
failure of [the] defendant . . . to report [his] alibi to the police was improper . . . [and] the
prosecutor‟s comments during summation were improper [especially] [t]he prosecutor‟s
consistent implication that defendant and his trial counsel had concocted the alibi”).
37
Santiago, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
38
Savage, 409 N.E.2d at 862.
31
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speak to the police and he succinctly told them his feelings. 39 In one
sentence, he stated he was not the shooter.40 This statement only
implicated him as being present at the incident.41 The court held “the
defendant maintained an effective silence.”42 This conclusion was
ascertained from the fact the defendant wanted to remain silent,
understood he had no obligation to elaborate, did not have to
implicate his friend, and had “knowledge . . . his decision not to
speak would not be used against him at trial.”43 Ultimately, the
defendant‟s post-arrest omission about naming the actual shooter was
found to be “of minimal probative value.”44 If presented to a jury,
however, a defendant‟s “ „pretrial failure to speak when confronted
by law enforcement officials‟ ” carries the risk of being highly
prejudicial.45
Lastly, the court concluded the defendant “did not use his
Miranda rights as a shield against contradictions of untruths.”46
39

Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
Id. at 633.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 634.
43
Id.
44
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 634; see also Conyers, 420 N.E.2d at 935 (stating a
defendant‟s “silence in such circumstances may simply be attributable to his awareness that
he is under no obligation to speak or to the natural caution that arises from his knowledge
that anything he says might later be used against him at trial”).
45
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 633 (quoting Conyers, 420 N.E.2d at 935); see also Conyers,
420 N.E.2d at 934. The New York Court of Appeals created what has become known as
“the Conyers proscription [against use of post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes]”
(quoting Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 634).
[T]he risk of prejudice is substantial whenever the prosecution attempts
to impeach a defendant‟s trial testimony by questioning him about his
prior failure to come forward with an exculpatory version of events.
Jurors, who are not necessarily sensitive to the wide variety of
alternative explanations for a defendant‟s pretrial silence, may be prone
to construe such silence as an admission and, as a consequence, may
draw an unwarranted inference of guilt. Because evidence of a
defendant‟s pretrial silence may have a disproportionate impact upon the
minds of the jurors and because the potential for prejudice inherent in
such evidence outweighs its marginal probative worth, we conclude that
the use of such evidence for impeachment purposes cannot be justified
in the absence of unusual circumstances.
Id. at 935-36.
46
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 634; see also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971)
(“The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way
of a defense, free from risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent statements.”).
40

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [2012], Art. 21

844

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

[T]he United States Supreme Court held that a
statement obtained in violation of any aspect of a
defendant‟s Miranda rights, although not admissible
as evidence-in-chief, may be used to impeach a
defendant who chooses to take the stand and whose
testimony is inconsistent with his illegally obtained
statement.47
But here, the defendant‟s statements at trial were consistent with his
pre-trial statements.48 The defendant here was impeached “not with
an inconsistent statement, but, rather, with his failure to speak, to tell
the police” the identity of the shooter.49 Therefore, the case falls
under the purview “of [People v.] Conyers,50 which concerns the use
of post-arrest silence” and the prosecutor‟s general prohibition “from
using such silence for impeachment purposes.”51 The court found it
improper for the People to use the post-arrest silence to impeach the
defendant.52 Due to its substantial prejudicial effect, the error was
not harmless as it could have affected the verdict.53 The summation
references to the post-arrest silence compounded the error and a new
trial was warranted.54

47

People v. Maerling, 474 N.E.2d 231, 233 (N.Y. 1984).
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 635. The defendant was perfectly consistent when he testified
he was at the shooting and that Mustafa was the shooter, and when he said during a pre-trial
interrogation that he was at the shooting and was not the shooter.
49
Id.
50
420 N.E.2d 933 (N.Y. 1981).
51
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 635; see also Conyers, 420 N.E.2d at 934; id. at 935 (stating
the New York Court of Appeals has recognized “evidence of defendant‟s pretrial silence
may have a disproportionate impact on the minds of the jurors”).
52
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
53
Id. (articulating the only evidence provided that the defendant was the shooter was “incourt identification of the defendant by two brothers and their friend” and “grainy
surveillance video and still pictures taken from the video” from which the identity of the
shooter was not discernable).
54
Id.; but see Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 637-38 (Rivera, J., dissenting) (stating defendant
prevailed at suppression hearing and was not insulated from cross-examination for
impeachment purposes regarding omission of shooter‟s identity as it was the ultimate issue
in the case and because the Miranda shield is not permitted to be used as a sword. Further,
the summation remarks were improper but not flagrant enough for a reversal as evidence of
guilt was overwhelming).
48
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REFERENCE DURING TRIAL REGARDING DEFENDANT’S
SILENCE AT OR NEAR TIME OF ARREST

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees that “no person shall be” compelled “to be a witness
against” him or herself in a criminal matter.55 This amendment,
which encompasses the right to remain silent and the selfincrimination clause, is said to “register[ ] an important advance in
the development of our liberty—one of the great landmark‟s in man‟s
struggle to be civilized.”56 The Supreme Court stated that the right to
remain silent “reflects many of our fundamental values and most
noble aspirations . . . [and allows an individual the privilege] „to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life.‟ ”57 Although it
may “sometimes [be] „a shelter to the guilty,‟ [it] is often „a
protection to the innocent.‟ ”58
A.

The Federal Approach

The right to remain silent is a constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination in criminal matters because anything an individual
says can be used against him or her in court.59 Once a suspect is
arrested and a “custodial interrogation” is initiated by law
enforcement, the suspect may “indicate[ ] in any manner, at any time
prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent [and]
the interrogation must cease.”60 Additionally, any statement obtained
by or used by the government in violation of a defendant‟s Fifth
Amendment rights is inadmissible during the defendant‟s criminal
trial.61 Miranda warnings are only administered to a suspect during
55

U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .”).
56
Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956); see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1, 3 (1964). In this landmark case, the Court held the privilege against self-incrimination is
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
57
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm‟n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting
United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 566, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting)).
58
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)).
59
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
60
Id. at 473-74.
61
New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459-60 (1979). When given a grant of immunity
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or after being placed in custody when the objectively reasonable
person would ascertain they are under arrest.62 After he or she is
given Miranda warnings, a suspect may “knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a
statement.”63 Therefore, unless Miranda warnings “and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as the
result of an interrogation can be used against [the defendant].”64
However, the Court determined in Harris v. New York65 that use of
evidence for impeachment purposes allows for a more lenient
interpretation.66
In Harris, the petitioner was arrested for allegedly selling
heroin to an undercover police officer and was interrogated without
being properly Mirandized.67 The statements made during the police
interrogation were rendered inadmissible for the prosecution‟s casein-chief under Miranda.68 The petitioner took the stand in his own
defense and testified he knew who the arresting police officer was,
but that he never sold heroin to the undercover cop.69 The testimony
contradicted the statements made during the post-arrest police

to provide testimony before a grand jury, the witness testimony given cannot be later used in
the case-in-chief nor for impeachment purposes in a criminal trial against that witness.
62
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 485 (stating warnings must be given “as soon as practicable after
arrest” and prior to any “interview with [a] person for a confession of admission of his own
guilt”). See also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (stating during a DWI
stop, the defendant knew while he was being questioned that he was not under arrest or
functionally under arrest and was not waiving his rights).
63
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
64
Id. at 479-80 (explaining “the Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual
when confronted by the power of government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that
an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself [and] [t]hat right cannot
be abridged . . . . [L]iberty [] demand[s] that government officials shall be subject[ ] to . . .
rules of conduct . . . [because] [c]rime is contagious [and] [i]f the government [became] a
lawbreaker, it [would] breed[ ] contempt for [the] law [and] invite[ ] every man to become a
law unto himself; it [would] invite[ ] anarchy”).
65
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
66
Id. at 225-26 (“Had inconsistent statements been made by the accused to some third
person, it could hardly be contended that the conflict could not be laid before the jury by
way of cross-examination and impeachment.”).
67
Id. at 222-23.
68
Id. at 223-24 (stating the defendant was not informed of his right to an attorney before
being questioned); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
69
Harris, 401 U.S. at 223 (claiming the bag sold did not contain heroin but only baking
soda).
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interrogation.70 On cross-examination, the prosecutor impeached the
petitioner by asking about and reciting the statements made to the
police post-arrest.71 The petitioner “testified that he could not
remember virtually any of the questions or answers” made during
that interrogation.72 The jury convicted the petitioner and the
petitioner appealed.73 The Court stated that physical evidence could
be used for impeachment purposes despite being inadmissible for use
during the case-in-chief.74 Furthermore, it reasoned, “[t]he shield
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use
perjury by way of the defense, free from the risk of confrontation
with prior inconsistent statements.”75 The judgment was affirmed
and the use of the “earlier conflicting statements” was appropriately
utilized to impeach the petitioner.76
The Supreme Court has reviewed many issues surrounding
the right to remain silent and the nuances involved in resolving the
constitutionality of using a defendant‟s statements for impeachment
purposes. In Doyle v. Ohio,77 the Court held the use of a Mirandized
suspect‟s silence for impeachment purposes at trial was
fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process.78 This is known
as a Doyle violation.79 However, in Jenkins v. Anderson,80 the Court
held that prior to Miranda warnings, a suspect‟s silence can be used
70

Id.
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Harris, 401 U.S. at 224; see Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (holding
physical evidence inadmissible during case-in-chief allowed for impeachment purposes).
75
Harris, 401 U.S. at 226. The Court logically elaborated on its reasoning in stating:
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative
use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the
defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the
Government‟s possession was obtained to his own advantage, and
provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.
Id. at 224.
76
Id. at 226.
77
426 U.S. 610 (1976).
78
Id. at 618.
79
See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 (“We hold that the use for impeachment purposes of the
petitioner‟s silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
80
447 U.S. 231 (1980).
71
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for impeachment purposes by the prosecution when cross-examining
a defendant.81 The Jenkins decision “does not force any state court to
allow impeachment through the use of prearrest silence.”82 It only
states that this form of impeachment is constitutional.83 The crucial
difference between Doyle and Jenkins focuses on fundamental
fairness based upon the fact that “Miranda warnings inform a person
that he has the right to remain silent and assure him, at least
implicitly, that his subsequent decision to remain silent cannot be
used against him.”84
The Court has also considered what standard should be
utilized when assessing the impact on a jury verdict where a
defendant‟s post-Miranda silence was improperly used for
impeachment purposes.85 In Brecht v. Abrahamson,86 a Doyle
violation occurred when post-Miranda silence was used by the
government to impeach the defendant during a murder trial.87 The
defendant was arrested, given his Miranda rights, and charged with
murder for allegedly shooting his brother-in-law in the back with a
rifle.88 The defendant took the stand and mentioned for the first time
that he committed the shooting, but stated it was an accident. 89 The
prosecutor inferred the defendant remained silent until all the
evidence was heard and then testified by creating “this crazy story”
that the shooting was an “accident.”90 The Court held it was an error
to use the post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes.91 The
standard to determine the impact on the verdict is whether the error
had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
81

Id. at 240 (“We hold impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . [but this] decision today does not force any state court to allow
impeachment through the use of prearrest silence . . . [and] [e]ach jurisdiction remains free
to formulate [its own] rules . . . [to define when] silence is viewed as more probative than
prejudicial.”).
82
Id.
83
Id. at 240-41.
84
See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239-40.
85
See Brecht, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
86
507 U.S. 619 (1993).
87
Id. at 625-26; see also Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618.
88
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623-24.
89
Id. at 624.
90
Id. at 625.
91
Id. at 628-29.
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jury‟s verdict” and not whether the error was “harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.”92 The Court affirmed the conviction because the
petitioner‟s post-Miranda silence was mentioned infrequently and the
weight of the matter was primarily decided on the substantial
circumstantial evidence.93
More recently, in Berghuis v. Thompkins,94 the Court held that
a suspect who makes any uncoerced statement to police waives the
right to remain silent.95 Thompkins was arrested in Ohio for murder
and given his Miranda warnings.96 However, he refused to sign a
document stating he understood the Miranda warnings.97 The police
then questioned him for about three hours.98 Thompkins remained
silent almost the entire time.99 Then the police switched their
questioning to beliefs about God.100 An officer asked if Thompkins
would pray to God and ask for forgiveness for killing the victim.101
Thompkins answered in the affirmative.102 This was the key
evidence submitted for his murder conviction.103
The Supreme Court held in Thompkins that one can waive the
right to remain silent by uttering a one-word answer.104 The Court
granted certiorari to determine: (1) if Thompkins‟ silence invoked his
92

Id. at 622-23; see Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638 (holding a “harmless-error standard applies in
determining whether habeas relief must be granted because of a constitutional error of the
trial type”); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946) (stating that the
“substantial and injurious effect” standard was established in this matter which is a less
burdensome standard of review where relief for trial error is granted if actual prejudice
resulted); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding “before a federal
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”).
93
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638-39.
94
130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
95
Id. at 2264.
96
Id. at 2256.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2258 (“[E]vidence demonstrates that Thompkins was silent for
two hours and forty-five minutes.”).
100
Id. at 2257 (stating police asked Thompkins about his belief in God about two hours
and forty-five minutes into the interrogation and that Thompkins eyes swelled up in tears).
101
Id. (“Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?”).
102
Id. (“Thompkins answered „Yes‟ and looked away.”).
103
Id. (describing denial at suppression hearing concerning inadmissibility of one-word
answers made during interrogation with police).
104
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
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right to remain silent, and (2) if Thompkins had adequately waived
that right.105 The Court ruled in favor of the government on both
issues.106 The Court held that simply being silent was not enough to
invoke the right to remain silent, but that a suspect needed to
expressly invoke the right to remain silent.107 This holding is similar
to the earlier reasoning in Davis v. United States,108 where the Court
held an express request for an attorney is necessary to invoke the
right to counsel.109 Secondly, the Court held Thompkins waived his
right to remain silent as soon as he uttered a word.110 Thompkins
could have simply remained silent because he understood anything
he said would be held against him.111
B.

New York Approach

In Conyers, the New York Court of Appeals stated that the
rules of evidence in New York prevent the use of a defendant‟s postarrest silence for impeachment purposes at trial.112 The court did not
address either the due process clause of the New York Constitution
or the Jenkins v. Anderson decision reached a year earlier by the

105

Id. at 2259.
Id. at 2664 (“Thompkins did not invoke his right to remain silent . . . he waived his
right to remain silent by making a voluntary statement to the police.”).
107
Id. at 2260 (“Thompkins did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not
want to talk with the police . . . . [H]e did neither, so he did not invoke his right to remain
silent.”).
108
512 U.S. 452 (1994).
109
Id. at 459 (“[T]he suspect must unambiguously request counsel . . . he [or she] must
articulate his [or her] desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable
police officer in the circumstance would understand the statement to be a request for an
attorney.”).
110
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263 (holding Thompkins waived his right to remain silent
because his conduct indicated waiver based on the fact he was fully aware of his rights and
voluntarily responded to the question “about praying to God for forgiveness for shooting the
victim”).
111
Id. (“If Thompkins wanted to remain silent, he could have said nothing to [the police
officer‟s] questions, or he could have unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights and ended
the interrogation.”); id. at 2263-64 (stating an accused‟s statement is admissible at trial if
Miranda warnings were given and a subsequent implied or express waiver of Miranda rights
has been determined); see also id. at 2264. The Court held a one-word answer was a waiver
of the right to remain silent.
112
Conyers, 420 N.E.2d at 934 (“[O]ur State rules of evidence preclude the use of a
defendant‟s [post-arrest] silence to impeach his trial testimony.”).
106
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United States Supreme Court.113 Thomas Conyers‟ armed robbery
conviction was overturned by the Appellate Division because the
prosecutor used his post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes.114
The New York Court of Appeals stated a defendant‟s post-arrest
silence is of low probative value because of the awareness of no
obligation to speak.115 However, the use of post-arrest silence for
impeachment purposes in front of a jury presents a “grave danger of
prejudice.”116 The Appellate Division‟s decision was affirmed
because the New York “judicially created rule of exclusion was
premised upon the familiar standard [of] whether the prejudicial
effect outweighs the probative worth of the evidence.”117
In New York, one can be faced with various nuances
regarding impeachment issues. Cross-examination of the defendant
is only permitted for impeachment purposes if the “door is opened”
by the defendant‟s direct testimony.118 This examination is permitted
to impeach the defendant, but not to establish fact.119 Similar to
federal law, New York law holds that as soon as the defendant‟s
testimony is discovered to be only suitable for purposes of
impeachment “any Miranda infirmity becomes irrelevant.”120
However, voluntary statements obtained by law enforcement in
violation of a defendant‟s Miranda rights are only permitted to be
used for impeachment purposes and not for use in the case-in113

Id. (“[W]e do not find it necessary to consider whether the use of a defendant‟s
postarrest silence for impeachment purposes is permissible under the constitutional
principles articulated in Jenkins or whether the due process clause of our State Constitution
[ ] precludes the use of such evidence to impeach a defendant‟s trial testimony.”); see also
Jenkins, 447 U.S. 231; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
114
Conyers, 420 N.E.2d at 934 (affirming the finding of a due process violation in using
post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes). The People requested certiorari and the
Supreme Court remanded the case due to the Jenkins holding on pre-arrest silence having
similar constitutional issues. Id.
115
Id. at 935.
116
Id. at 936 n.2.
117
Id. at 936 (“[O]ur decision today represents a simple recognition of our judicial
responsibility to formulate rules of evidence to protect the integrity of the truth-finding
process.”).
118
People v. Wise, 385 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (N.Y. 1978).
119
Id. at 1267.
120
Id.; see also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1975) (“[I]t does not follow from
Miranda that evidence inadmissible against [the defendant] in the prosecution‟s case-inchief is barred for all purposes . . . . [T]he impeaching material would provide valuable aid
to the jury in assessing the defendant‟s credibility.”).
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chief.121 In People v. Maerling,122 the defendant invoked his right to
counsel yet made voluntary statements pertaining to a murder, which
were improperly obtained, and these statements were allowed to be
used for impeachment purposes.123 In People v. Savage,124 the
defendant was read his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived his
right to remain silent to inform the police about a shooting.125 While
giving testimony at trial, the defendant mentioned for the first time
the gun “inadvertently” went off while the victim attempted to rob
him.126 The Court of Appeals held this flagrant omission was
properly used for impeachment purposes by the prosecutor.127
However, as a balancing precaution, “the State is denied the right to
draw adverse inferences from the fact that a defendant has
maintained an effective silence, even if something less than total.”128
The New York harmless error rule pertaining to nonconstitutional trial errors is different than the federal rule for
constitutional trial errors.129 In New York, all errors of law are
121

People v. Maerling, 474 N.E.2d 231, 233 (N.Y. 1984).
We have permitted the use of illegally obtained evidence for
[impeachment] purpose[s] . . . . Our rule permits the use for
impeachment not only statements obtained in violation of a defendant‟s
Miranda rights, but also of those obtained in violation of his right to
counsel under the State Constitution. [However], a statement obtained
in violation of the defendant‟s Federal constitutional right to counsel is
not admissible for impeachment purposes . . . . [A]dmissibility rests . . .
on a determination of voluntariness. If a statement was voluntary it may
be used to impeach; if it was not, it may not be admitted.

Id.
122

474 N.E.2d 231 (N.Y. 1984).
Id. at 232.
124
409 N.E.2d 858 (N.Y. 1980).
125
Id. at 859 (stating the defendant said “I‟m glad I‟m caught - I‟m tired” and
subsequently told the police about him shooting a man outside a bar).
126
Id. at 859-60.
127
Id. at 860-61. The defendant never mentioned anything about a robbery or the
accidental firearm discharge prior to trial. Id. at 861 (holding when someone is a victim of a
robbery or a gun accidently discharges and such major items are not mentioned the
“omission speaks more eloquently than words. It is an elementary rule of evidence, and of
common sense, in our State . . . that, when given circumstances make it most unnatural to
omit certain information from a statement, the fact of the omission is itself admissible for
purposes of impeachment”).
128
Savage, 409 N.E.2d at 862.
129
People v. Crimmins, 326 N.E.2d 787, 793 (N.Y. 1975); id. at 791 (stating the test for
harmless constitutional trial error is “that there is no reasonable possibility that the error
might have contributed to the defendant‟s conviction and that it was harmless beyond a
123
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prejudicial and require a reversal “unless that error can be found to
have been rendered harmless by the weight and the nature of the
other proof.”130 In one New York Appellate Division case, the
defendant took the stand during his trial for manslaughter.131 He was
improperly asked why he did not make a statement regarding his
version of events prior to the trial.132 On appeal, the prosecutor‟s acts
were declared improper.133 The conviction was overturned as the acts
were not harmless and the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.134
However, in another Appellate Division case, the prosecutor
impeached the defendant by asking why he did not ask his friends to
exonerate him at the police station after his arrest for allegedly
stealing property.135 During summation, the prosecutor informed the
jury of the defendant‟s post-arrest silence.136 The court did not
overturn the conviction because the overwhelming evidence rendered
the prosecutor‟s trial errors harmless.137
In New York, it would seem a prosecutor with a strong case
can take improper steps for impeachment purposes and use the
prejudicial silence card to cement and maintain high conviction rates.
This would plausibly coincide with the United States Supreme
Court‟s holding regarding the standard used to determine whether the
impact of the prosecution‟s „error‟ had a “substantial and injurious
effect or influence” on a jury‟s verdict.138 Therefore, it appears the
possibility of a strong case getting overturned for impeachment errors
is highly unlikely where guilt was overwhelmingly established
through utilizing real evidence rather than conjecture.
III.

CONCLUSION
Tucker‟s conviction was overturned and a new trial was

reasonable doubt”).
130
Id. at 794.
131
People v. Livingston, 512 N.Y.S.2d 889, 890 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1987).
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
People v. Materon, 716 N.Y.S.2d 313, 313 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2000).
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38.
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granted.139 In light of the Supreme Court‟s holding in Thompkins, it
strongly appears Tucker waived his right to remain silent.140 He
expressly invoked his right to remain silent, but shortly afterwards
said, “I was there, but I did not shoot anybody.”141 Thompkins held
that a suspect who makes an uncoerced statement to police waives
the right to remain silent.142 Tucker was not coerced.143 He spoke
after he was told he was going to be charged with attempted
murder.144 Tucker appeared to understand his rights because he
initially told the police he had nothing to say. 145 If he wanted to
remain silent, then he simply could have done so. The right to
remain silent can be waived by communicating a single word
answer.146 Thereafter, what was said can be used in court to impeach
the defendant.147 However, the New York Court of Appeals
maintains there is such a thing as “effective silence.”148 The United
States Supreme Court simply does not—there is either complete
silence or there is waiver.149 Therefore, anything Tucker said should
have been allowed to be used against him for impeachment
purpose.150
As the dissent indicated, the shooter‟s name was the ultimate
issue in the case and this blatant name omission left Tucker‟s
testimony open for impeachment purposes.151 The appellate court
could have addressed the omission issue differently by not
downplaying the shooter‟s name in the analysis.152 In custody,
Tucker waived his right to remain silent as per Thompkins,153 but the
139

Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2262-63.
141
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
142
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263.
143
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 632-33 (majority opinion).
144
Id. at 633.
145
Id. at 632-33.
146
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
147
Harris, 401 U.S. at 226.
148
Savage, 409 N.E.2d at 861-62 (“[T]he intent behind the privilege against self
incrimination, exemplified by the supportive Miranda procedures it has spawned, is not to
induce silence but only to insure that the choice to speak is free and uncompelled.”).
149
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
150
Maerling, 474 N.E.2d at 233.
151
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 638 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
152
Id. at 635 (majority opinion).
153
See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
140
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omitted exculpatory information was only first presented at trial.154 It
appears his credibility could have been properly impeached.155
However, the decision determining the unfairness of the defendant‟s
impeachment during cross-examination ignored the recent Thompkins
holding and instead allowed New York‟s concept of “effective
silence” to prevail.156
The prosecutor made a trial error by ignoring the suppression
hearing decision.157 The mentioning of Tucker‟s post-arrest “silence”
during summation was improper.158
However, the defendant
admitted to being at the crime scene during the time of the
shooting.159 After three other witnesses testified that he was the
shooter, Tucker testified he was in the grainy video that captured the
occurrence of the crime.160 Tucker further claimed that the shooter
was an individual named “Mustafa” and this statement may have
divested him of the protections granted from the suppression
hearing.161 It is plausible Tucker attempted to incorrectly use his
Miranda rights as a sword, rather than the shield such rights were
designed to be, in protecting a suspect against self-incrimination.162
The weight of circumstantial evidence in this matter could have been
seen as substantial enough to render harmless the prosecutorial error
made during summation.163 In other words, the summation error
could appear harmless against “the weight and the nature of the other
proof.”164 However, despite these conceivable arguments, a new trial
154

Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264; see also Savage, 409 N.E.2d at 861.
156
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 634-35; see also Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264; Savage, 409
N.E.2d at 861.
157
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
158
Id. at 635 (majority opinion).
159
Id. at 633.
160
Id. at 635.
161
Id. at 637 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
162
Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
163
Id. at 638; see also Crimmins, 326 N.E.2d at 794.
164
See Crimmins, 326 N.E.2d at 794.
What is meant here, of course, is that the quantum and nature of proof,
excising the error, are so logically compelling and therefore forceful in
the particular case as to lead the appellate court to the conclusion that „a
jury composed of honest, well-intentioned, and reasonable men and
women‟ on consideration of such evidence would almost certainly have
convicted the defendant.
155
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was warranted due to a “lack of overwhelming evidence of the
defendant‟s guilt” and the highly prejudicial effect of referencing the
defendant‟s post-arrest silence during the government‟s crossexamination and summation.165
The true point of contention is that the prosecution‟s multiple
summation errors did much more than simply compound the
government‟s cross-examination error.166
Tucker‟s post-arrest
statements were held not be used during the government‟s case-inchief.167 A prosecutor who repeatedly makes blatant comments
referencing suppressed evidence during summation should simply
suffer the consequences of a mistrial. Such an audacious disregard of
Fifth Amendment rights should not be tolerated or held to be
“harmless.” When the law demands you are not to be given an inch,
justice mandates severity when a yard is deliberately taken. We need
to seriously consider the aggregate effect of such flagrant
prosecutorial misconduct regarding one of our fundamental
constitutional rights. After all, “[o]ur government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher . . . liberty demand[s] that government officials
shall be subject[ ] to . . . rules of conduct . . . [and if those rules are
disregarded] it [would] breed[ ] contempt for [the] law [and] invite[ ]
every man to become a law unto himself; it [would] invite[ ]
anarchy.”168
Robert Mitchell*

Id.
165

Tucker, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 635 (majority opinion).
Id.
167
Id. at 637 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
168
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479-80.
*
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